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The relative merits of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism as a contractual 
incentive in construction have been much contested. This question was investigated using 
a comparative case study of two building projects in Hong Kong. Data was collected 
through semi-structured interviews, review of project documentation and 
communications, and passive observation of project meetings. The findings suggest that 
the GMP mechanism has low incentive intensity from an instrumental rationality 
perspective and high incentive intensity from a value-expressive perspective. Further 
analysis of the findings leads to two main conclusions about the potential value of the 
GMP mechanism to a client: (a) it can provide some flexibility in responding to short-
term market changes and other idiosyncratic factors and (b) it can be a useful instrument 
for project work group integration. Based on current approaches to GMP projects in 
Hong Kong, the ultimate compensation for the additional risk transfer to the contractor 
should come from the applied mark up or fee rather than any expectation or possibility of 
some financial reward for net cost savings.                                    
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INTRODUCTION 
Incentives are an important and ubiquitous component of construction contracts because 
they are considered to align the goals of contracting parties with project objectives 
(Turner, 2004). Contractual incentives generally involve one or both of two mechanisms 
(Bower et al., 2002): cost incentives, whereby partners undertake to work jointly to 
reduce the outturn project cost for an opportunity to share any underruns and, sometimes, 
overruns of a target cost according to an agreed formula; and performance incentives, 
whereby rewards and/or sanctions are tied to the attainment or non-attainment of pre-
agreed performance targets in relation to outcomes like quality/functional specifications, 
(sectional) completion date, safety, and resource utilisation. The majority of research on 
contractual incentives has concentrated on testing their impacts on performance 
outcomes, with mixed findings. Most studies (e.g. Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 
2001; Hinze, 2002) have reported no significant effects, while others  (e.g. Ashley and 
Workman, 1986) reported marginal improvement in performance quantity (rather than 
quality) but also significantly more contractual disputes. Equally, studies on cost 
incentives have produced mixed findings with most studies (e.g. Bower and Merna, 
2002) reporting better flexibility in planning and improved teamwork but no clear effect 
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on outturn project cost, and others reporting tangible improvement in performance 
outcomes (e.g. Hauck et al., 2004). Explanations for the inconsistent findings have often 
involved references to, among others, level of analysis confounding (Bresnen and 
Marshall, 2000), how even the most ‘objective’ key performance indicators are at best 
inadequate and can be highly corruptible (Fernie et al., 2006), incentive contingency 
misalignment (Hinze, 2002). Thus, any research that seeks to provide situated 
understanding of contractual incentives would seem useful. The purpose of the present 
paper is to present the findings a study that investigated the promises, shortfalls and 
pitfalls of the guaranteed maximum price (GMP) mechanism.  
 
The GMP mechanism is one example of a cost incentive, which is usually used on 
traditional or management forms of contract. Conceptually, the GMP contract has been 
characterised as a hybrid arrangement consisting of a cost-reimbursable contract to a 
target price (the GMP amount) and a fixed price contract beyond (Boukendour and Bah, 
2001). Under such an arrangement, a client is contractually obliged to pay the GMP 
amount or a lower price (Carty, 1995; Turner, 2004): If the outturn cost exceeds the GMP 
amount, the fixed price contract applies and overruns accrue at 100% to the contractor; In 
the event that the works are completed for less than the GMP amount, the client pays this 
lesser price and the difference (i.e., net cost saving) is then shared according to a pre-
agreed formula between the client and the contractor(s). The findings of previous 
research on the GMP mechanism have been mixed. While some researchers consider its 
use in a construction contract as a fool's game (Turner, 2004) and very risky (Stukhart, 
1984), others argue that it provides an effective and legitimate framework for risk 
transfer (Pryke and Pearson, 2006), is an effective solution for the problem of integration 
in construction projects (Lampman and Dimeo, 1989), and can lead to better project 
outcomes and value for money (Chan et al., 2007). In short, the GMP mechanism is still 
a black box phenomenon, with a recent RICS survey of building contracts in use also 
noting that its use was under reported and may have withered away (RICS, 2007). The 
present study is an attempt at providing some useful insight into this area of construction 
contracts. 
 
According to Bower et al. (2002:37), the fundamental principle of incentivisation is that 
"joint risks unify motives". This indicates the centrality of human motivation in efforts to 
align parties' goals with project objectives. According to field theory (cf. Gold, 1999), 
motivation for human behaviour is a function of both the individual and environmental 
exigencies: the extrinsic factors stem from contractual obligations and formal structures 
of control, which routinely link individuals' outcomes, in terms of rewards and sanctions, 
to some standard(s) of performance; whereas the internal factors stem from individuals' 
desire to maintain and project favourable social identities, which leads them to engage in 
discretionary and value-expressive behaviours. Thus, a broad proposition adopted in this 
study is that the GMP mechanism would influence individuals' performance behaviours 
directly through the reward/sanction contingency and indirectly by shaping the work 
group context. An analysis of the influences of the GMP mechanism on project work 
group climate and teamwork aspects, hence project outcomes, should provide some 
insight into the conditions for appropriate use of, and how contractors should respond to, 
the GMP mechanism in construction projects. In the sections that follow the present, the 
research method is outlined followed by an analysis of the results and then a discussion 
of the findings. The paper ends with a discussion of conclusions and implications for 
research and practice. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
The influence of the GMP mechanism on work group cooperation was studied using a 
comparative case study design set within a critical realist perspective. The comparative 
case study design allowed the central issues and working hypotheses in the study to be 
shaped through the use of replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994), whereby each 
case serves as a field experiment that confirms or disconfirms inferences drawn from the 
other. The critical realist research approach assumes that individual project work group 
members' behaviours shape and are in turn shaped by project procedures, practices and 
processes, and seeks a Weberian understanding of the underlying dynamics (Smyth and 
Morris, 2007). Case studies provide a holistic view and in-depth understanding of the 
project practices and processes, the frameworks or paradigms that guide these practices 
and processes, their influences on the cooperative behaviours of project work group 
members, as well as work group members’ rationalisations of those processes and their 
impacts (Eisenhardt, 1989). The comparative case study approach was, thus, considered 
to be suitable for the present study. 
 
Careful selection of cases is important to the effectiveness of a comparative case study 
design (Zartman, 2005).  An overview and comparison of major features in the two 
selected case studies is provided in Table 1. Each case was part of a programme (of 
projects). The first case (hereafter, Alpha) was a mixed-use commercial complex and had 
a prestigious property developer client. The second case (hereafter, Beta) was a single-
use residential development and had a public sector client. Both clients are regular and 
major procurers of construction works and services. The cases embody contrasts that are 
important to the effectiveness of the comparative case study design: firstly, the residential 
single-use versus commercial mixed-use project typologies represent perhaps the least 
and most technically complicated, respectively, of construction projects (cf. Gidado, 
1996); and secondly, the private versus public sector client typologies impose perhaps the 
least and most constraints, respectively, on clients' project behaviour. Also, that each case 
was part of a programme is important because this allows for the discussions to be 
situated in the wider contexts of the client organisations' ongoing businesses. These 
cases, thus, enable structured and focused comparisons and the identification of patterns 
in events, contexts and behaviour (Zartman, 2005).  
 
Data sources and analysis procedure 
Data was gathered through six main sources. We examined project documents and 
correspondences, minutes of project meetings, reports and press commentaries, and 
observed a cross-section of project meetings. Semi-structured interviews were then 
conducted with six executive directors and 15 mid-level/senior managers in Alpha and 
three executive directors and seven general/senior managers in Beta. Each interview 
lasted between one and two hours and was conducted by the first author with the help of 
a colleague who took notes and filled in gaps in the questioning. Soon after each 
interview, facts/impressions were recorded and cross-checked, recordings transcribed 
verbatim, and important issues or information gaps flagged for follow-up in subsequent 
interviews. All interviews generally followed a common interview protocol, which 
included questions on the characteristics and objectives of the project, project governance 
structures and processes, project performance criteria, measures and outcomes, team-
building practices, and questions/issues flagged up in previous interviews, project 
meetings or the review of project documentation. Each interview was, however, eclectic 
and reflexive. Anvuur and Kumaraswamy 
 
Table 1: Overview and comparison of major features in case studies 




HK$640 million, 25-storey grade “A” mixed-
use commercial complex. Sixth of seven 
sequential phases in HK$1.64 billion premium 
office and retail complex in city centre.  
HK$434 million, 3No 41-storey (2,369 
flats) public rental housing estate, 
trialling R&D components/elements. 
Fourth of six phases sequenced to 
service affordable housing demand.  
Procurement 
method 
Based on consultants’ designs and in-house 
project management. Sequential and linked 
traditional contracts for demolition, 
foundations and superstructure. Incorporates a 
non-binding partnering charter.  
In-house design and project management 
services, external quantity surveyor. 
Single traditional contract, with non-
binding partnering charter and dispute 
resolution advisor (DRAd).   
Incentive 
features 
Liquidated damages for late completion of 
demolition contract; win-lose schedule 
incentive for foundation contract, plus lump 
sum award for excusable compensatory delays; 
GMP superstructure contract with: liquidated 
damages tied to two sectional completion 
dates; client indemnification against delay of 
foundation contract; and jointly managed 
design development fund (about 2% of GMP 
amount).    
Liquidated damages tied to sectional 
completion dates to meet annual delivery 
quotas; win-lose bonus (approx. 1% of 
contract value) for satisfactory safety 
performance record; GMP clause 




Complexity― technical, medium; logistical, 
high. Risk― technical, low; 
logistical/financial: high. Novelty― technical: 
medium/high. 
Complexity― technical, low; logistical, 
high. Risk― technical, low; 




Cognitive priming and interventions for 
socialisation standardise work processes, skills 
and outputs. The GMP mechanism used to 
facilitate some joint risk and performance 
management. 
Prescribed sequences, many formalised 
meetings, informal communications and group 




Cognitive priming and interventions for 
socialisation standardise work processes, 
skills and outputs. The GMP mechanism 
used to maximise risk transfer, with 
limited joint performance planning. 
Prescribed sequences and web-based 
operations and information management 
system, a formalised monthly site 
meeting, informal communications and 
lateral consultation used for information 




Norms of contractual solidarity supplant 
formal procedures and are enshrined in a 
dominant client culture. 
Norms of contractual solidarity operate 
within constraints of formal procedures 
and are project specific. 
Work group 
cooperation 
High level of cooperation attributed mainly to 
individuals' self-expressive motives, shaped by 
work group climate. 
High level of cooperation attributed 
mainly to individuals' self-expressive 
motives, shaped by work group climate.  
Project 
performance 
Client’s development objectives are achieved. 
Partners meet baseline expectations, enhance 
future business opportunities.  
Client expects to achieve development 
objectives. Partners expect to meet 
baseline expectations, enhance future 
business opportunities. 
 
J.C. Flanagan's (1954) critical incident technique was adapted and used during the semi-
structured interviews as an investigative – rather than scientific – tool, whereby each 
interviewee was asked to think of the single most difficult problem encountered on the 
project to date, which required the collective effort of the project work group to resolve 
and for which the nature and timing of their response was "make or break" for the 
project. Each interviewee was then asked to describe the circumstances of this problem,                                                                                               GMP implementation value 
 
the specific actions they took to try to resolve it and their evaluations of the responses of 
others in their proximal work group. Remarkably, all interviewees in each case identified 
the same problem: for Alpha, this was a major redesign of the structural frame and core 
wall, which event took place barely two months after commencement of the 
superstructure works; and for Beta, the problem was a delay in obtaining statutory 
approval for a gabion wall design. "Decision stories" of cross-functional work group 
problem-solving were developed, by combining the accounts of each interviewee into a 
time line beginning with problem identification. The information so gathered provided 
compelling evidence of the extent of team work n each case. 
 
In the course of the semi-structured interviews, interviewees also completed short 
structured questionnaires designed to measure work group climate, fairness of decision-
making procedures, processes and outcomes, and intrinsic job satisfaction. Each 
CEO/director interviewed was also asked to state their company's corporate objectives 
and then to rate, on a Likert scale (0 = "not at all important", 10 = "extremely 
important"), the importance of the stated objectives and others not mentioned by them in 
a set of 10 commonly cited corporate objectives. Interviewees also provided reasons to 
substantiate or qualify their ratings of the questionnaire items. Item measures for work 
group climate were adapted from Albanese (1994), those for work group decision-
making norms were adapted from Hauck et al. (2004), while item measures for intrinsic 
job satisfaction were adapted from Tyler and Blader (2000). Items for the corporate goals 
question were adapted from Bourgeois (1980). Data collection for Alpha was undertaken 
between September 2004 and November 2006 and for Beta, between October 2006 and 
August 2008. The data collection yielded over 420 pages of text comprising handwritten 
notes and verbatim interview transcripts, which were coded to reflect common themes 
and then analysed for patterns. This was complemented with an analysis of group-level 
scores of work group climate, fairness of decision-making norms and outcomes, intrinsic 
job satisfaction, and corporate goals.  
 
FINDINGS  
The cases: nature, scope, objectives and strategies 
Table 1 provides an overview and comparison of major features in Alpha and Beta. The 
project actors in both cases were selected on the bases of competence and commitment to 
relational norms, as demonstrated on previous projects undertaken with the present and 
other clients. Each case also used facilitated team-building workshops and periodic 
champions meetings. Operational coordination in each case was achieved through masses 
of informal communications – via telephone conversations, e-mails and meetings – and 
decisions were generally made by consensus of work group members. In each case, a 
variations protocol, incorporating an adjudication panel and variation quotation 
procedure, was used for tracking, valuing and agreeing the category membership (i.e. 
variation versus design development) of change requests. 
 
In Alpha, all three construction contracts were placed with one main contractor on the 
basis of negotiation. The GMP mechanism was used to share design development risk in 
the superstructure contract with the main contractor, with the most uncertain aspects of 
the scope of works – the retail podium levels – being the subject of provisional sums. 
Underruns of the GMP amount (constituting 71% of total works value) were to be shared 
60/40% between client and main contractor and overruns at 100% to the main contractor, Anvuur and Kumaraswamy 
 
with back-to-back arrangements between the main contractor and any contributing 
named specialist subcontractors.  
 
In Beta, the main contract was placed on the basis of competition among so-called 
"premier league" contractors drawn from the client's tender lists. The GMP mechanism 
was used mainly to transfer design development risk to the main contractor. The in-house 
project management team still had to first approve any value engineering proposition 
from the contractor and then facilitate the process of obtaining statutory approval for the 
modified designs. Underruns of the GMP amount (constituting 31% of total works value) 
were to be shared 50% apiece between the client and main contractor and overruns at 
100% to the main contractor, with back-to-back arrangements between the main 
contractor and the GMP work package subcontractors. The project contingency fund of 
about HK$10 million was wholly earmarked for the R&D elements and so did not 
provide any protection to the contractor against overruns of the GMP amount.  
 
Project outcomes 
All the performance targets for case Alpha were reasonably met. All the completion 
dates, including sectional completions, were achieved. The out-turn quality of the works 
was adjudged as very good. The project’s out-turn cost exceeded the budgeted cost by 
about 1% but was within the overall redevelopment budget. Despite some modest 
savings made from the competitive placement of subcontract work packages, there was 
no net savings left to share as the design development fund was fully expended. No 
serious site accident was registered and no complaint of major disruption to any 
adjoining business was lodged. Alpha featured an impressive list of creative solutions 
and was awarded many industry recognition awards and achieved the highest (i.e. 
Platinum) rating in the prestigious Hong Kong Building Environmental Assessment 
Method certification scheme. Alpha was a great business success for the client, as rents 
from tenant signings were double the initial expectations. All the project partners, 
including the subcontractors, met their baseline expectations and felt that they had greatly 
enhanced their reputations with one another and especially with the client, hence their 
chances of repeat business. 
 
Beta was on track in terms of achieving the project objectives and targets set for it. 
Materials specifications were rigorously adhered to. Performance quality was adjudged 
as very high, the results of mock ups were very satisfactory, the trialling of the R&D 
initiatives seemed to be coming along nicely and the construction site safety record was 
impeccable and won the main contractor an industry recognition award. Some modest 
GMP net cost savings (about HK$1.5 million in total) were reported but this was largely 
seen as being only of symbolic - rather than substantive - value. The project was shaping 
up to be a big success for the client. The client’s own expectation for net project cost 
savings of about 3% with the incorporation of the GMP mechanism was exceeded as the 
main contractor tendered a price for the works, which was more than 10% below the 
consultant’s estimate. The main contractor and the GMP subcontractors seemed 
confident they would meet their baseline objectives. They felt that they had improved 
relationships with one another and especially with the client, hence enhanced their 
chances of repeat business. Another important outcome for the main contractor and GMP 
subcontractors was the first-mover advantage in a contractual mechanism which they 
believed would favourably shape the space of their future competitiveness. 
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Work group climate and teamwork aspects 
Findings from qualitative interview data 
Research (e.g. Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2007; Moreno-Luzon and Begona Lloria, 
2008) suggests that deliberate interventions for socialisation, as were evidenced in both 
Alpha and Beta, facilitate the construction of shared understandings of work performance 
standards and processes and output expectations, hence can constitute well understood 
mutual risk and performance planning. In both cases, the GMP mechanism transformed 
the sequential interdependence between project actors (by courtesy of the traditional 
procurement method) into reciprocal interdependence. There was strong recognition by 
project actors in each case of mutual interdependence and joint fate, and there was joint 
commitment by work group members to work together. That this was also observed in 
Beta is significant given that the GMP subcontract packages accounted for only one-third 
of the total value of works.  
 
Decision-making (negotiations) in each case was procedurally fair and characterised by 
joint problem-solving and a tendency towards relationship preservation; norms which 
Hauck et al. (2004) argued are characteristic of effective teams (as opposed to work 
groups). Again, the GMP mechanism was credited with providing the platform on and 
shaping the contexts within which norms of solidarity could develop. It was evident in 
each case that work group members derived intrinsic satisfaction from work group 
interactions and felt important to the smooth functioning and success of their work 
groups. In each case, work group members attributed the good performance outcomes to 
the high levels of teamwork experienced and as evidence, interviewees routinely cited the 
collective action of work group members in response to the "critical incident" (which 
unfortunately cannot be elaborated because of space constraints). 
 
However, the contexts within which the norms of contractual solidarity and teamwork 
developed were different. In Alpha, the norms of contractual solidarity were embedded in 
a dominant client culture into which the project actors were actively socialised. In Beta, 
these norms were largely project-specific and were consolidated only after work group 
learning especially from the "critical incident". At the organisational level within the 
client establishment, these norms had subversive undertones, although this client boasts 
about having pioneered partnering in the public sector in Hong Kong. There was a sense 
of subdued caution, sometimes reticence, on the part of the client's in-house project 
managers when dealing with the constructors, especially when assessing value 
engineering proposals; and this attitude was primarily to stave off any suspicion of 
impropriety. 
 
Findings from questionnaire data 
Table 2 presents the means of self-reported ratings of work group characteristics and the 
participative value of work group interactions. In order for the mean ratings to be 
interpreted with any confidence, evidence of sufficient rating consensus is required. 
Therefore, the James et al.'s (1984) within-group interrater agreement coefficient (rwg) 
was computed for each work group aspect. Interrater agreement indices of 0.70 or higher 
are generally considered to indicate satisfactory rating consensus (LeBreton et al., 2003). 
The quantitative ratings were elicited in order to corroborate findings from the qualitative 
interview data. The results in Table 2 are very supportive. The James et al. (1984) 
interrater agreement coefficients were substantially higher (rwg ≥ .97) than the 0.70 
minimum threshold for all four rating categories and across the two cases. Anvuur and Kumaraswamy 
 
Table 2:  Characteristics and participative value of work group interactions 
  Alpha (n = 20)^    Beta (n = 7) 
Questionnaire statement  Mean*  SD  Skew    Mean*  SD  Skew 
Work group members characteristics (For Alpha, rwg = .98; for Beta, rwg = .97)† 
Had shared goals (Goal congruence)  4.00  0.73  –0.919    4.57  0.53  –0.374 
Were interdependent (Interdependence)  4.10  0.72  –0.152    4.14  0.69  –0.174 
Had mutual respect for one another (Mutual 
respect) 4.05  0.76  –0.086 
 
4.43 0.53  0.374 
Shared commitment to work together (Joint 
commitment) 4.00  0.79  0.000 
 
4.29 0.49  1.230 
Decision-making norms  (For Alpha, rwg = .98; for Beta, rwg = .97)†  
Locate/adopt options that satisfy collective 
interests (Joint problem-solving)  3.70  0.80  –0.736 
 
4.29 0.49  1.230 
Use threats/harassment, time pressure, 
positional commitments (Contending)‡   3.80  0.95  –0.782 
 
4.43 0.53  0.374 
Are honest about strength of feelings on issues 
(Truth in signalling)  3.65  0.81  –0.541 
 
4.14 0.69  –0.174 
Use fair standards and procedures, and seek 
objective information (Principled negotiation)  4.05  0.60  –0.012 
 
4.43 0.53  0.374 
Willing to concede on less important issues 
(Mutual responsiveness)  4.05  0.76  –0.888 
 
4.00 0.58  0.000 
Decision-making outcomes  (For Alpha, rwg = .97; for Beta, rwg = .79)†  
Have been exploited and compromised (Win-
lose outcomes)‡   3.95  1.23  –1.202 
 
3.43 1.40  –0.052 
Have damaged relationships (Adversarialism)‡  4.50  0.61  –0.785    4.57  0.53  –0.374 
Have achieved high joint benefit (Win-win 
outcomes) 3.70  0.66  0.396 
 
3.86 0.90  –1.569 
Have ‘attacked the problem, not the people’ 
(Professionalism)   4.35  0.93  –2.535 
 
4.14 1.46  –2.122 
Intrinsic job  satisfaction (For Alpha, rwg = .98; for Beta, rwg = .97)† 
Worthwhile 4.32  0.82  –1.359    4.29  0.49  1.230 
Worse than most‡   4.37  0.68  –0.632    4.57  0.53  –0.374 
Better than most  3.79  0.71  0.336    3.86  0.69  0.174 
Undesirable‡   4.42  0.90  –1.517    4.14  0.90  –0.353 
Enjoyable 3.68  0.82  0.007    4.29  0.49  1.230 
^ Except that n = 19 for the intrinsic job satisfaction items; * Mean ratings are based on a Likert scale with 
anchors (1 = “strongly disagree”, 5 = “strongly agree”); † Within-group interrater agreement coefficients 
(rwg) are based on a uniform null distribution with Var(E) = 2.0; ‡ Item was reverse-scored. 
 
All the mean ratings across rating categories and cases in Table 2 are significantly higher 
than 3.0 and majority are higher than 4.0, thus indicating that respondents generally agree 
with the individual and work group criterion statements. The results confirm findings 
from analysis of the qualitative data that, across Alpha and Beta: (a) workgroup members 
were characterised by mutual interdependence, mutual respect and joint commitment to 
work together towards cooperatively linked goals; (b) negotiations were principled, 
procedurally fair, characterised by joint problem-solving; (c) decision outcomes were 
generally fair and integrative; and finally, (d) work group members derived intrinsic                                                                                               GMP implementation value 
 
satisfaction from work group interactions. The results of the CEO/directors' self-reported 
ratings of the corporate goals question indicate that company prestige (rated at 8 or 
higher, i.e. as "very important" to "extremely important", by all seven CEO/directors in 
Alpha and all four directors in Beta), then, net profit over five years (rated as "very 
important" to "extremely important" by six out of seven CEO/directors in Alpha and 
three out of four directors in Beta) were the two most important corporate objectives for 
all participating firms in both Alpha and Beta, thus, confirming that the participating 
firms were driven by medium- to long-term prospects, rather than the maximisation of 
short-term profit.    
 
DISCUSSION  
The findings indicate that the GMP mechanism can significantly improve work group 
cooperation and teamwork. The findings also show that the influence of the GMP 
mechanism is mainly through its ability to favourably shape the work group context 
rather than its instrumental appeal. Vroom's (1964) seminal work on expectancy theory 
suggests that the incentive intensity of any contractual incentive is determined by the 
interplay between three factors: valence, the value of the promised reward; 
instrumentality, trusting belief that the reward is contingent on adequate performance; 
and expectancy, self-efficacy beliefs. The findings from the cross-case analysis suggest 
that all three dimensions were generally low in each case. Therefore, on the basis of 
economic rationality, it has to be concluded that the incentive intensity in each case was 
low. Turner’s (2004) criticism of the GMP approach as being a fool's game was from an 
instrumental perspective, and is consistent with the finding in the present study. This is 
not to suggest that the motives of project actors were devoid of instrumentality. In 
contrast, the consultants and constructors in both Alpha and Beta considered their firms' 
chances of repeat business due to improved relationships with the respective clients as 
having much more superior instrumental appeal than the promise or expectation of 
performance-contingent rewards.  
 
However, the major influence of the GMP mechanism was in providing a framework for 
and facilitating the development of a work group climate conducive for effective 
teamwork. The GMP mechanism deepened the level of interdependence between 
participating firms and fostered norms of solidarity among project work group members. 
This finding is consistent with the broader incentivisation principle that 'joint risks unify 
motives' (Bower et al., 2002). Research (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Blader and Tyler, 
2009) shows that work group membership esteem, favourable cognitive (and, in the case 
of Alpha, affective priming), reciprocal interdependence and procedural fairness, as were 
evidenced in both case study projects, encourage more inclusive superordinate 
categorisations of work group memberships. The two results, goal congruence and work 
group identification, are powerful drivers for teamwork  and discretionary cooperative 
behaviours (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). Another significant finding of the study is that, 
while financially inconsequential, the GMP cost savings realised in both case study 
projects were of symbolic value - collective teamwork products - and were considered to 
be greatly energising. This finding is consistent with social cognitive theory (Bandura, 
2001), which suggests that rewards which serve as a validation of professional 
competence and instil self-assurance can improve intrinsic motivation. From this 
perspective, the findings of this study are consistent with those of previous studies 
(Lampman and Dimeo, 1989; Pryke and Pearson, 2006) on the positive influence the GMP 
approach can have on the level and quality of teamwork. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The marketing of the GMP approach often over emphasises its instrumental appeal. The 
findings of this study show that this potentially can create gaps in expectations between 
project partners and dissatisfaction with project outcomes. The findings have several 
implications. They suggest that research on contractual incentives should focus not only 
on the incentive outcomes so narrowly defined but also on the broader influences on 
project governance. The GMP approach is a useful instrument of flexibility that clients 
can use to respond to short-term uncertainties in the market (demand) or other 
idiosyncratic factors. It is also an instrument of integration that clients can use to 
integrate both the processes and people in project work groups. The GMP approach can, 
therefore, be a powerful mechanism for project governance. The GMP approach does 
result in the transfer of design development risk to the main contractor, financial 
compensation for which should be priced into the main contractor's tender figure; the 
compensation should not be based on any promise, or the consequent expectation 
thereon, of some sharing of net cost savings. 
 
This study also has several limitations, which must be highlighted. Because the case 
studies were undertaken in Hong Kong, the findings may not be readily generalisable to 
other cultural contexts. The fact that the clients in the two case study projects both had 
regular and major construction spends, and so could promise - hence create expectations 
of - repeat business, may have dwarfed the financial incentive intensity of the GMP 
mechanism. Both case studies were also of major projects, which raise questions as to the 
applicability of the findings to smaller projects. Also, while the case studies provided 
important contrasts that enabled a fruitful comparative analysis, theoretical sampling 
requirements (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989) were not likely to have been met. These limitations, 
however, provide opportunities that future research might usefully explore. Future 
research could undertake conceptual replications of the present study with improvements 
in the research design (e.g. using theoretical sampling), in different cultural contexts, 
using case studies of smaller projects and of one-off/on-off clients in order to confirm the 
validity and extent of generalisability of these findings. That said, this study provides 
crucial and situated understanding of the relative merits and conditions of use of the 
GMP mechanism in construction projects.  
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